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BLOOMIN' DISASTER: EXTERNALITIES,
COMMONS TRAGEDIES, AND THE ALGAL BLOOM
PROBLEM
BENJAMIN BRYCE & ROBERT SKOUSEN*
ABSTRACT
Toxic algal blooms are appeaing with increasing frequency across the
counnby. These blooms, fueled by risingglobal temperaturesand nutrientpollution, pose seriousrisks to human health, the environment, andthe economy.
Although the federalgovernment effectively regudates some sources of algaecausingnutrientpollution,exemptions under the Clean Water Acthinitfederal
restrictions on nonpoint source nutrientpollution from agriculturalactivities.
State governments' efforts to Jill this regulatoiy void are often capable of addressingalgalbloom risks within state-containedwatersheds. However, relying
upon state-levelagriculturalnutrientpollution regulationto prevent algalbloom
problems tends to be less successful when interstate watersheds are involved.
This Article analyzes the pocy challenges associated with preventing algal
blooms and offers specific proposalslor overcoming these challenges. By analyzingalgalbloom problems through GarrettHardin'sfamiliarcommons framework and integratingthe insights of Elior Ostrom and others about how to
address various types of commons tragedies, this Article exposes the shortcomings ofexistingpolicyapproachesto algalbloom prevention and highhghtssome
innovative alernative strategiesfor addressingthe problem. This Article ultimately argues that algal bloom risks arisingwithin larger interstate watersheds
involve broadernegative extemalLy problems than state regulatorsare capable
of efectively addressing, justifying saonger federal regulation of agricultural
nonpoint source nutient pollution in those contexts. One potential federallevel approach to the problem suggested in the Article is to allow states whose
waterresources arepolluted by upstream states to enforce interstate Total Maximum DailyLoads ("TMD1s') againstpolluangstates. By applying well-establshedlegalacademicconcepts to an emergingpoEcy challenge, this articleseeks
to influence how scholars andregulatorsapproach algal bloom prevention policy in the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2014, a small, but concentrated, algal bloom appeared in
Lake Erie's Maumee Bay.' The bloom manifested as a thick green sludge that
contained microcystin, a toxin that "can cause nausea, vomiting, and liver damage if ingested."' Nearby City of Toledo intake pipes sucked up the toxic water
and introduced it to the municipal water supply.! Officials soon determined
that their city water contained dangerous levels of the toxin and issued this dire
warning: "DO NOT DRINK THE WATER," and "DO NOT BOIL THE
WATER."2
Toledo's municipal water not only became unsafe to drink, it had developed toxicity that actually became worse when boiled.! Soon, over 400,000
people in the Toledo area lacked clean drinking water. Many panicked.
Stores quickly ran out of bottled water.! Restaurants, libraries, and schools
closed.! Residents traveled to nearby towns, and some even left the state in
search of potable water.o Ohio's Governor declared a state of emergency."
1. Codi Kozacek, Toledo Issues Emergency 'Do Not Drnk Water' Warng to Residents,
CIRCLE OF BLUE (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.circleofblue.org/2014/world/toledo-issues-emergency-warning-residents-drink-water/.

2.
3.

Id.
Id.

4. 'Donot drink, do not boi' water: Crisis closes out second day with little information,
WTOL 11 NEws (2014), http://www.wtol.com/story/26178506/do-not-drink-do-not-boil-wateradvisory-issued-for-issued-for-lucas-county-surrounding-area.

5.

Id.

6. Kozacek, supra note 1.
7. See Taylor Dungicn & David Patch, Toledo-area water advisory expected to contiue
through Sundayas leadersawait tests; water stationsto remain open, THE TOLEDO BLADE (Aug.
2, 2014), http://www.toledoblade.conmlocal/2014/08/02/City-of-Toledo-issues-do-no-drink-water-advisery.html.

8.

Id.

9. Kozacek, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Tap Water Ban for Toledo Residents, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/us/toledo-faces-second-day-of-water-ban.h
tml; see also Kozacek, supra note 1.
11. Kozacek, supra note 1.
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Nearby, unaffected municipalities offered water to residents of Toledo for free."
The Red Cross and other charitable organizations created water distribution
centers and delivery systems for those unable to leave their homes. The National Guard delivered bottled water and military rations to homeless shelters
and to other at-risk people who could not cook with their water." After two
excruciating days, city officials finally lifted the advisory; but City officials
warned residents to flush their household water lines. Toledo's experience
was a short-lived but vivid reminder to conmunities across the country of the
potential dangers that toxic algal blooms create.
Toledo water treatment plants were unprepared for the 2014 algal bloom,
despite the city's expenditure of millions of dollars on special water-treatment
equipment during the previous year to protect against water toxins. 7 Treatments of bloom-contaminated water are expensive, and concerns about algal
blooms have driven up spending on requisite equipment in recent years." In
the words of Adam Rissien, Director of Agricultural and Water Policy at the
Ohio Environmental Council,
I have every conlidence in the water treatment plant to figure out how to make
the drinking water safe. Unfortunately, the options available to them are costly
and that means a rate increase-there's no way around it. Until we reduce
choSDhorus and address harmful alral blooms, I'n afraid it's going to come
on the ratepayers' backs. And that's not fair.
The bacteria that cause algal blooms are common throughout freshwater
and marine ecosystems." However, algal blooms are likely to occur at increasing rates and become more severe in many regions of the country in the coming
years.2 In 2016, major algal blooms appeared in Lake Erie;` the Gulf of

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kozacek, supia note 1.
Id.
Id.

20. WORLD HEAL-rH ORCANIZATION, Toxic CYANOBACFERIA IN WATER: A GUIDE TO
THEIR PUBLIC HEALrH CONSEQUENCES, MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT § 1.1 (Ingrid Cho-

rus & Jamic Bartram cds., 1999), http://www.who.inVwatcrsanitationh_leldcsourceslitydit/t
oxcVanbegin.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Pam F. Gorder, Number ofsevere algalbloomsin LIke Eric to
double, forecast sa zs: Climate change 'supchames' algae, making it harder to prcent, THE
OHIO STATE UNIV. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://ncws.osu.edu/news/2015/12/16/eriecentury/.
22. Robert Ferris, Wi are there so many toxic blooms this year?, CNBC NEws (Jul. 26,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/26/why-arc-there-so-maiw-toxic-algae-blooms-tiis-vear.ht
ml.
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Maine"; Utah Lake, Utah;` Lake Okeechobee, Florida;' Pyramid Lake, California;" Shasta Lake, California;" and elsewhere in more than twenty states." In
2016, California alone posted algal bloom danger advisories for at least thirty
lakes and reservoirs." Although blooms sometimes happen naturally, many
times they are caused by human-caused nutrient pollution," which can come
from urban storm runoff, wastewater treatment, fossil fuels, agricultural runoff,
and household products." In particular, runoff from commercial agriculture
can be a significant contributor to algal bloom problems and is regulated less
stringently than other sources of nutrient pollution." Although some states have
taken steps to regulate agricultural nutrient pollution within their own borders,
these states cannot lower nutrient pollution from other states." Therefore, the
problem of interstate nutrient pollution is unlikely to be solved without additional federal regulation.
Without question, algal blooms are a worsening problem within the United
States.' Growing nutrient loads in lakes and streams increase the incidences of
algal blooms.' Current federal and state regulations have failed to sufficiently
reduce nutrient loads, and severe algal blooms have become more common.

23. Id. (stating that the algal blooms in the Gulf of Maine "are almost entirely natural. However, in some cases, particularly in some freshwater blooms, humans are playing a part.").
24. Courtney Tanner, Utah Lake closed due to health concerns from large algal bloom, SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE (Jul. 15, 2016), http://www.sltrib.conVnews/4119973-155/utah-lake-closed-dueto-health.
25. Ferris, supra note 22.
26. Joseph Serna, Summer conditions growing toxic algal blooms in two California lakes,
L.A. TIMEs (Jul. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-pyranmid-lake-algaebloom-20160714-snap-story.html.
27. Id.
28. Lesley McClurg, Poisonous Algal Blooms Threaten People, Ecosystems Across U.S.,
NPR NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/29/491831451/poisonous-algae-bloom
s-threaten-people-ecosystems-across-u-s.
29. Id.
30. WHO, supra note 20, at § 1.1.
31. Sources and Solutions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENcY (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/sources-and-solutions.
32. See Mary J. Angelo & Jon Morris, Maintaininga Healthy Water Supply While Growing
a Healthy Food Supply: Legal Tools for Cleaning Up Agricultural Water Pollution,62 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1003, 1003-04 (2014) (noting that despite agriculture producing a significant percentage
of nutrient pollution, the Clean Water Act's failure to regulate nonpoint source pollution through
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") has left agricultural run-off
largely unregulated).
33. See Robin K. Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate Nonpoint
Source Pollution?A ComparativePerspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 12 (2015).
34. SceJ. Heisler et al., Eutrophicationand Harmful Algal Blooms: A Scientific Consensus,
8 HARMFUL ALGAE 3, 4 (2008) ("It is generally recognized that there have been more coastal algal
blooms, often of greater geographic extent and/or longer duration, with more toxic species observed, more fisheries affected, and higher associated costs from algal blooms in the past decade
than in previous decades."); see also C.B. Lopez et al., SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF FRESHWATER
HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMs 9 (2008) (acknowledging that algal blooms have increased within
freshwater systems).
35. Heisler et al., supra note 34, at 4.
36. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:Structuringa Regulatory Response to AgrculturalNonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U.J. L. & POL'Y 21,
23-25 (2002).
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Fortunately, Garrett Hardin's familiar "commons" framework and basic economics principles related to negative externalities help to highlight some of the
factors contributing to this regulatory failure. Among other things, viewing algal
bloom challenges through these frameworks reveals the need for stronger federal government involvement in certain settings and a greater emphasis on curbing agricultural runoff pollution to slow the increase of algal blooms and their
costly consequences.
Part I of this Article explains how nutrient pollution and climate change
have fueled increases in algal blooms in recent years and details how current
laws have failed to address this trend. Part II frames certain specific instances
of algal blooms as commons tragedies and others as interstate negative externality problems. Part III applies the principles associated with these frameworks
to emphasize the unique regulatory challenges that algal blooms create within
interstate watersheds, and to argue that a stronger federal approach is needed
to stop algal blooms in those settings. Part IV describes specific federal government approaches capable of better addressing the nation's algal bloom risks.
Among other things, Part IV advocates for laws that would empower states,
whose algal blooms are occurring within interstate watersheds, to hold polluting
states responsible for agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution that contributes to the problem.
I. THE GROWING ALGAL BLOOM PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES

Algal blooms impose significant costs on local communities and greater society." Unfortunately, for the reasons discussed below, they are likely to become even more commonplace and severe in the coming years. A major contributor to algal blooms is the introduction of excessive nutrients into water
bodies.' One significant source of this nutrient pollution is agricultural nutrient
pollution, which is not heavily regulated under the Clean Water Act and remains prevalent despite state-level regulatory efforts." Accordingly, new laws
that reduce agricultural nutrient pollution levels could be among the most costeffective and promising means of reversing the nation's trend toward more frequent and severe algal blooms.
A. ALGAL BLOOMS CAUSE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE

Toxic blooms, often referred to as harmful algal blooms,"0 are an exceptionally pernicious problem that can pose significant threats to human and animal
health. The recent water crisis in Toledo was not the first time this hazardous
type of algal bloom has imposed substantial adverse impacts on a local economy." The dangers of algal blooms have been known for over 100 years, with

&

37. See inli note 52.
38. Heisler ct al., supma note 34, at 4.
39. Angelo & Morris, supwa note 32, at 1004-05.
40. HarnidI Algal Blooms: Tinr' Organimis iith a To)xic Punch, NAT'L OCEANIC
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanscivice.noaa.gov/hazards/hab/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
41. See Dilwyn .1. Grifliths & Martin L. Saker, 77e Pahn Isand Miusten' Disease 20 Years
On: A Reiiew of Rcseach on Cranotoxin CS'lindispemnopsin, 18 ENrtL. ToxicoOcY 78,
78-79 (2003) (explaining how, in 1979, a bloom in Australia released toxins into the local water
supply that caused an outbreak of severe "hepatitis-like" illness. The illness was labeled the Pain
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extreme cases causing thousands of animal deaths from ingestion of algae-poisoned water." In some cases, large animals have died within minutes of exposure to cyanotoxins produced by algal blooms.
In addition to threatening humans and animals, algal blooms also pose serious risks to the environment Hypoxia refers to a state of oxygen depletion in
a waterbody." Hypoxic conditions can create a "dead zone" where plants, fish,
and other animals cannot survive.' Hypoxic conditions occur as algal blooms
exhaust nutrient supplies and die.' The decomposition process uses the available oxygen in the water, leaving nothing for other animals and plants." In the
northern portion of the Gulf of Mexico, a 10,250 square mile dead zone covers
where the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers enter the gulf.' Although this is
the largest dead zone in the United States, others exist elsewhere, such as in the
Chesapeake Bay and the Florida Everglades. Algal blooms also block sunlight
from entering the water column and thereby danage the ecology of the water
body." This lack of sunlight kills aquatic plants, which also consume oxygen as
they decompose."
For obvious reasons, algal blooms can likewise harm local and state economies.5 Blooms can be very expensive to treat and prevent. One conservative
estimate puts the cost of algal blooms in the United States at over $2.2 billion
annually. 3 Algal blooms can diminish property values, necessitate additional
'

Island Mystery Disease and hospitalized over 100 children, making it one of the more serious

cases of human cyanobacterial poisoning in history).
42. Ian Stewart et al., Recreationaland OccupationalField Exposure to FreshwaterCyanobacteria - A Review ofAnecdotaland CaseReports, EpidemiologicalStudies and the Challenges
lbrEpidemiologicAssessment, ENVrL. HEALTH, Mar. 24, 2006, at 1, 2-4 (detailing the potential
for algal blooms to cause death, including an anecdotal account that blamed an HAB for the
death of a teenage boy. The coroner who reviewed the case found that the boy died from accidental ingestion of neurotoxic cyanotoxin. This is the first recorded human death from recreational cyanobacterial exposure in the United States, though there are some questions about the
reliability of the coroner's interpretation).

43. Id.
44. Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1008.
45. Id,
46. Linda Brcggin & D. Bruce Myers Jr., Subsidies with Responsibities:PlacigStewardship
and Disclosure Conditions on Government Payments to Laige-Scale Commody Crop Opera-

tions, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 487, 496 (2013).
47. Id.
48.

Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1008-09.

49.

Id.

50. Breggin & Myers Jr., supranote 46, at 496.
51. John Manuel, Nutrient Pollution: A Persistent Threat to Waterways, 122 ENVrL.
HFALTH PERSPECTIVES, no. 11, Nov. 2014, at A304, A305 (2014).
52. See Walter K. Dodds et al., Eutroplicationof US Freshwaters:Analysis of Potential
EconomicDamages, 43 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 12,16-18 (2009); see also Matilde Mereghetti, Chile
Drafts Emergency Plan for Future Algal blooms, UNDERCURRENT NEWS, (Dec. 8, 2016, 4:32
PM), https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2016/12/08/chile-drafts-emergency-plan-for-future-alg
ae-blooms/ (describing an algal bloom in the Los Lagos region of South America in the Spring of
2016 that destroyed approximately 40,000 metric tons of salmon, costing the salmon industry
nearly $600 million).
53. H. Kenneth Hudnell, The State of US. FreshwaterHarmful Algal Blooms Assessments,
Policyand Legislation, 55 ToxicoN 1024, 1024 (2010) (cstimating the cost of harmful algal blooms in the U.S. to be somewhere between $2.2 billion and $4 billion).
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funding to protect endangered species, threaten drinking water supplies, interfere with commercial fishing operations, limit local recreation and tourism, and
cause a myriad of other problems."
B. ALGAL BLOOMS OCCUR WITH GROWING FREQUENCY
Algal blooms become more frequent as temperatures rise and more nutrients enter water systems.5 Cyanobacteria, or blue-green algae, can expand to
massive proportions' and are found in oceans, lakes, the tropics, and in the
Earth's poles." These bacterial blooms appear as scum on the water's surface."
Algal blooms require warm water5" and abundant nutrients to grow." As such,
global warming and growing levels of added nutrients in water systems create
increasingly optimal conditions for algal blooms to occur." For example, scientists project that the number of blooms in Lake Erie alone will double over the
next 100 years."
1. Climate Change Exacerbates the Problem of Algal Blooms
Global warming has.the potential to encourage algal bloom proliferation in
many regions because cyanobacteria reproduction generally occurs best at relatively high temperatures.' As the Earth's oldest known oxygen-producing organisms, cyanobacteria are particularly well adapted to survive environmental
variations.' Additionally, rising water temperatures make it easier for cyanobacteria to accumulate at water's surface throughout the water column, facilitating dense, highly toxic blooms that appear earlier and stay longer.'
Carbon dioxide ("CO,") emissions-a primary contributor to human-induced climate change"-further encourage algal blooms because higher rates of
CO in the air help blooms reproduce at greater rates.1 Cyanobacteria require
CO, to support photosynthesis, and surface blooms can absorb COdirectly
54. Dodds et al., supa note 52, at 12-18.
55. Hnnful Algal Bloom (HAB)-Assoeiated Illess, CTRS. FOR DIsEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/habs/index.htl (last updated June 1, 2017).
56. Hudnell, supra note 53, at 1024.
57. Hans W. Paerl & Jef Huisman, Clmhate Change: A Catalst for Global Evpansion of
Hannfd CianobacteialBkoms, 1 ENvrL. MICROBIOLOGY REP. 27, 32-33 (2009).
58. HarmfulAlgad Bloom (HAB)-AssociatedIllness, supra note 55.

59. See id.
60.
61.

Manuel, supia note 51, at A305.
Gorder, supla note 21.

62. Id.
63.

Paerl & Huisman, supma note 57, at 29-30.

64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. at 29-30 (explaining that water density changes with temperature, with water becoming
denser as it becomes colder. Warmer water is less dense and allows dispersed cyanobacteria to
float upwards and concentrate on the surIace of the water. This process is called vertical stratification. Though vertical sratilication in a water body may be a normal part of that ecosystem,
warming global temperatures can cause a water body to stratify earlier in the spring, maintain that
stratification through the summer, and de-stratitNj later in the fall. These concentrations of bacteria create blooms that a-c orders of magnitude more toxic than the surrounding water).
66.
W41hyr does C02getmost of the atention mihen ihere are many' other heal-uappinggases.,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTIsrs, http://'www.uesusa.org/global warming/science and _unpacts/science/C02-and-global-warming-faq.html#.Wa2OiTO-L-Y (last updated Aug. 3, 2017).
67. Paerl & Huisman, supia note 57, at 30.
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from the atnosphere." The growing proportion of CO, in the atmosphere provides algal blooms with an increasing supply of CO 2 that competing subsurface
plankton species cannot access.6
To make matters worse, climate change further stimulates algal blooms by
contributing to increased salinity levels in major water bodies." Increased
drought, rising seas, and increased use of freshwater for agricultural irrigation
have raised salinity levels in numerous water bodies." Higher salinity levels
benefit buoyant cyanobacteria by enabling them to more easily rise to the surface." Some species of cyanobacteria are much more tolerant of high salt levels
than competing phytoplankton species, giving them an advantage when competing for resources."
Climate change can even promote algal blooms by causing hydrologic and
weather changes within watersheds." For example, droughts punctuated by increasingly large storms wash large amounts of nutrients into watersheds, leaving
water bodies nutrient rich and relatively undisturbed. This can create the perfect conditions for algal blooms." Accordingly, as climate change worsens, these
impacts will continue to exacerbate the problem of increasing algal blooms.
2. Human Nutrient Pollution Provides the Conditions that Algal Blooms
Need
As stated above, algal blooms are thriving because of additional nutrients
that human activities have introduced into watersheds." Many. nutrients, such
as phosphorus and nitrogen, are normally found in water and soil, but human
activities have significantly increased the levels of these nutrients in lakes and
rivers." For example, stormwater runoff from cities and towns carries nutrients
into water bodies;" treated wastewater from sewers and septic systems causes
the addition of nutrients into water bodies;" fossil fuels introduce nitrogen into

68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Id. at 31.

71.

Id.

72. See id. at 29-31 (explaining how higher salinity levels create what is called vertical density
stratification. Buoyant cyanobacteria rise to the top of the water column which leads to more toxic
blooms).
73. Pacrl & Huisman, supra note 57, at 31-32.
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. (explaining that larger storms create greater surface run-off which carriers more nutrients into the waterbody than smaller storms otherwise might. Furthermore, smaller, more frequent storms flush a water system, which makes cyanobacterial reproduction more difficult.
However, long periods of drought interrupt these flushing cycles, leaving a nutrient-rich water
body primed for cyanobacterial blooms); see also Ben Guarino, 'We've pnmedthe system' Why
disgustngtoxic blue-grecen algae blooms seem increasinglycommon, THE WASH. POsT (Jul. 25,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/25/weve-primed-the-sy
stem-why-toxic-blue-green-adga-blooms-secm-increasingly-common/Putm-term-.ddfbf9cffl6d
(explaining that sevcrc storms can dredge up nutrients that have been trapped in sediment at the
bottom of a water body and release them into the water column).
76. Manuel, supra note 51, atA305-06.
77. Sources andSolutions, supia note 31.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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the air, which can make its way into a water body;" and household products
such as detergent, pet waste, and yard fertilizer also contain nitrogen and phosphorus, which eventually make their way into local water systems." However,
enormous quantities of manure, fertilizer-laden runoff, and soil erosion make
agricultural pollution one of the most significant sources of nutrient pollution
in the United States and "one of the greatest environmental challenges of our
time."82
The EPA has estimated that 28 percent of the nation's rivers and streams
have elevated levels of nitrogen and 40 percent have elevated levels of phosphorus.' For the same reasons that these nutrients make effective fertilizers for
crops, they also promote the growth of aquatic algal blooms." In fact, aquatic
plants like algae need far fewer nutrients to grow than terrestrial plants, by a
"magnitude of thousands."' For example, a single pound of phosphorus can
provide enough nutrients to produce up to 700 pounds of algae.' While a
comprehensive solution to the algal bloom problem would necessarily include
steps to curb climate change, reducing nutrient pollution represents a significant
step towards preventing future blooms.
C. WHY Focus ON AGRIcuuFURAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION TO ADDRESS
ALGAL BLOOMS
Although various forms of human nutrient pollution and climate change
contribute to the increased incidence of algal blooms in the United States, targeting agricultural nutrient pollution is arguably the most cost-justifiable means
of addressing this problem in the short term. For one thing, reducing nutrient
pollution within a single United States watershed is simpler than addressing
global warning because no international coordination is required." The efforts
of a single state or country to reduce CO, emissions are valuable but insufficient
to fully tackle the inherently global problem of climate change. In contrast, the
causes and impacts of agricultural nutrient pollution within many watersheds in
the United States are confined almost exclusively within the country's borders.
Accordingly, short-term domestic strategies aimed at reducing nutrient pollution are more likely to successfully reduce algal blooms when compared to the
unquestionably important challenge of curbing global greenhouse gas emissions.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
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Angelo & Morris, supia note 32, at 1003-04.
Manuel, supan note 51, at A306.
Id. at A305.

85. Oliver A. Houck, Cooperatic Fedclinm, Nutjients, and the C/ean Wiaer Act: iree
Cases Rerisited, 44 ENvrL. LAW REP. NEWs & ANALYSIS 10426, 10430 (2014).

86.

Id.

87. See Gordcer, supranote 21 (suggesting that nutrient reductions may not be enough to stop
algal blooms while climate change continues, but that any algal bloom mitigation strategy should
include nutrient pollution reductions).
88. See, c.g., Sewell Chan, KeyrPoints ofthe P;uis Clinate Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, (Dec. 12, 2015)
http://www.nytiimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/key-points-ofthe-final-pims-climate-draft (explaining the complex process that lead to the Paris Climate Accord).
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For at least two reasons, new restrictions on agricultural nutrient pollution
have greater potential to reduce algal blooms in many regions of the country
than regulations of other sources of nutrient pollution. First, among sources of
human nutrient pollution, agricultural nutrient pollution is the single greatest
contributor of nitrogen and phosphorus into the nation's water bodies." Second, other contributing sources of nutrient pollution are already significantly
regulated under existing laws, whereas sources of agricultural nutrient pollution
often are not."
1. Agriculture is a Significant Contributor to Nutrient Pollution
As previously stated, agricultural operations are one of the leading sources
of nutrient pollution in the United States." Agricultural nutrient pollution has
become commonplace throughout the country in part because of the "Green
Revolution" of the 1960's.' High-yielding varieties of grains like corn, wheat,
and rice allowed farmers to produce greater quantities of food as the global
population increased." Scientists selectively bred plants to create more efficient,
hybridized varieties that matured quicker and could adapt to year-round growing seasons.4 These crops soon became standard throughout U.S. agriculture."
Unfortunately, hybrid crops only produce their famously high yields when
farmers supply them with large amounts of water and fertilizer.' The ever increasing amounts of nutrients farmers have provided their crops over time has
led to U.S. farms shifting from "nutrient sinks" to "nutrient sources."" While
it is true that these hybrid grains and fertilization practices resulted in a 150
percent increase in crop production in the past 60 years, they have also introduced enormous amounts of nutrients into water systems, placing serious strains
on water quality." Plants only absorb a small percentage of nutrients applied to
a field, leaving the rest to make its way into water systems."' For example, in the
last 50 years, 600 tons of phosphorus were applied to agricultural lands globally,

89.
90.
91.

Seeinfa§I(C)(1).
See infna SI(C)(2).
See Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1005; Williams, supra note 36, at 22.

92. William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing EnvironmentalDegradationand
PoorPublicHealth with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 213, 251 (2009); see
also Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1005-06 (building upon Eubank's research into the
Green Revolution).
93. Eubanks, supranote 92, at 256.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 252.
97. Angelo & Morris, supia note 32, at 1005-06 (explaining how before the Green Revolution, a farm provided the nutrients needed on that farm through fertilizers that were produced
on that farm. These included animal manure and "green manure," which were crops that were
planted and tilled under to replenish depleted soil. After the advent of the Green Revolution,
farmers applied greater amounts of fertilizer to their fields than their farms could produce, making those farms nutrient sources. "What had been a mutually beneficial system in which animal
wastes fertilized the crops that fed the animals in a relatively 'closed loop' system, with minimal
pollution, became a serious environmental problem").
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while only 250 tons of that phosphorus were actually used by the plants." Similarly, agriculture is believed to produce approximately 66 percent of the nitrogen flowing out of the Mississippi River into the Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic dead
zone.o' Fertilizer and animal waste from farms generally contribute more nutrient pollution into United States water systems than other nonpoint sources."o
2. Other Significant Sources of Nutrient Pollution are More Heavily
Regulated than Agricultural Nutrient Pollution
Moreover, although many sources of human nutrient pollution, such as
wastewater treatment plants and stormwater runoff, are federally regulated, agricultural nutrient pollution largely is not." Differing legal approaches to the
categorization of nutrient pollution is at least partially to blame for persistently
high levels of agricultural nutrient pollution in water bodies throughout the
United States.
Sources of nutrient pollution are typically categorized as either point
sources or nonpoint sources. A point source is a single identifiable source of
pollution, such as contaminated water flowing through a pipe, ditch, ship, or
factory."' In contrast, nonpoint sources of pollution are dispersed and not easily
attributable to a single individual or location." Point sources are regulated under the Clean Water Act, which makes it illegal to discharge a pollutant from a
point source into waters of the United States without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit." In contrast, nonpoint sources
of pollution, such as run-off from farms, are not included under the NPDES
regulatory structure.' As such, agricultural nonpoint sources of pollution, like
agricultural stormwater discharges and irrigation return flows, are specifically
exempted from NPDES regulations."
The NPDES system is responsible for successfully reducing nutrient pollution from point sources such as stormwater discharge, wastewater treatment
plants, and factories.'" However, nonpoint source nutrient pollution continues
to be the leading impairment of rivers and lakes.'0 In fact, some prominent
water law scholars consider nonpoint source pollution to be one of the last major water quality problems in the United States."'
Expanding regulation to encompass agricultural nutrient pollution is likely
100. Id. at 1006.
101. Id. at 1008.
102.

Manuel, supa note 51, at A306.

103. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
104. CategoriesofPollution: PojitSouicc, NAT'L OCEANIc & ATMOSPHERIc ADMIN., http://o
ccanservice.noaa.gov/cducation/kits/pollution/03pointsource.hlnl (last updated July 6, 2017).
105. Categoties of Pollution: Nonpoint Souice, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://oceanscrvice.noaa.gov/educaion/kits/pollution/04nonpointsource.html (last updated July

6, 2017).
106. Sec 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (explaining that as a default rule all discharges from point sources
require an NPDES permit; only those specifically designated by the Administrator are exempt
from this requirement).
107. Id. (regulating point source pollution, but not pollution from nonpoint sources).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
109. Angelo & Morris, supma note 32, at 1004.
110. Id. at 1009.
111. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 10.
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to be a more cost-effective policy strategy for reducing algal blooms than is intensifying restrictions on other already heavily regulated pollution sources."'
Over the years, certain nonpoint sources have come under the regulation of the
NPDES program through congressional reclassification."' The most significant
of which is the reclassification of captured and channeled stormwater that is
then channeled or piped as a point source."' Industrial and municipal stormwater discharges are now regulated as point sources."' Regulatory changes that
similarly reclassified at least some types of agricultural nonpoint source pollution are arguably a mere continuation of this trend.
Moreover, because agriculture generally produces more nutrient pollution
than other nonpoint sources,"6 more stringent regulation could significantly reduce the number and severity of algal blooms."' Some water quality programs
have already tried to offset agricultural nutrient pollution by increasing the regulatory burden on other sources, but such programs will ultimately fail to successfully address algal bloom problems."' Expanding regulation to cover agnicultural nutrient pollution would be a more appropriate and promising way of
responding to these challenges."'
Of course, any new pollution restrictions affecting the United States agricultural industry should be tailored so as not to unjustifiably injure this important
and vulnerable sector of the nation's economy. Farmers face difficult choices
when determining how much fertilizer to apply to a field. In many instances,
uncertain soil and weather conditions can affect crop yields. Adding too much
nitrogen to soil increases the likelihood that nitrogen will escape into the environment. However, under-fertilizing can cut into crop yields, tempting some
farmers to over-fertilize to protect against their own downside risks.'" These
downside risks are significant for many farmers. Under the standard of a farm's
Operating Price Margin, a farm is within the high-risk "critical zone" when its
operating profits comprise less than ten percent of its gross cash income."' In
112. See e.g., RENA STEINZOR & EVAN ISAACSON, COUNTDOWN TO 2017: FIVE YEARS IN,
CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL AT RISK WITHOUT EPA ENFORCEMENT 25-27 (Ctr. for Progressive
Reform 2016) (http://progressivereform.org/articles/Chesbay2O17Countdownl601.pdf) (explaining how, in the context of the Chesapeake Bay, states have relied on greater reductions in nutrient
pollution from point sources like wastewater treatment plants. Because of this, the Chesapeake
Bay watershed boasts some of the largest and most advanced wastewater treatment plants in the
country. However, the watershed faces a problem of decreasing returns. Technological improvements will ultimately be unable to compensate for the impact of unregulated sources of nutrient
pollution).
113. Craig& Roberts, supra note 33, at 10-11.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 11.
116. Manuel, supra note 51, at A306.
117. See e.g., STEINZOR & ISAACSON, supra note 112, at 6-7 (illustrating this idea within the
context of the Chesapeake Bay).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 4 (referring to agricultural nutrient pollution within one watershed as the "largest
pollution source and the most promising and cost-effective sector for future reductions").
120. See MARC RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ERS No. 127, NITROGEN IN
AGRICUL- TURAL SYsTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSERVATION POLICY 4 (2011) (explaining

problems specific to nitrogen pollution, but which may be extrapolated to nutrient pollution in
general).
121. Robert Hoppe, ProlitMargins Increase with Eum She, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Feb. 2,
2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/januaryfebruary/profit-margin-increases-with
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2013, sixty-nine percent of U.S. farms were in this critical zone." Many only
remain profitable by relying on other income to support the farm. 2
Given that so many farmers operate under razor-thin margins, imposing
substantial new costs on farmers through nutrient pollution regulations could
place a significant burden on an already fragile industry. It is worth remembering that most agricultural emitters are not amoral polluters, but are merely rational actors in an imperfect system. Although additional regulation of agriculture may be justifiable to reduce the incidence and severity of algal blooms, a
heavy-handed and punishing approach that puts many farmers out of business
would be far less defensible. Any new laws aimed at curbing agricultural nutrient pollution would thus need to adequately account for their potential impacts
on farmers and farming communities.
D. CURRENT FEDERAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION REGULATION IS
INADEQUATE

Without question, federal regulations under the Clean Water Act fail to
adequately address agricultural sources of algae-causing nutrient pollution. Although the NPDES program does not regulate agricultural nutrient pollution,
the Clean Water Act does provide a kind of proxy nonpoint source regulation
through Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") requirements.'' Under the
Clean Water Act, states must set water quality standards for water bodies such
as rivers, lakes, and streams to serve as a check on point source NPDES permits." If a state fails to set an acceptable standard, the EPA is authorized to set
the standard for the state.'" In setting water quality standards, a state determines
the designated uses of a waterbody, like fishing, industry, or agriculture, and
then determines the level of pollutants it can sustain without damaging those
uses.'" If point source permits are insufficient to maintain the water body's
water quality standards, the state will define the waterbody as impaired.'" The
state must then set a TMDL for each pollutant that impairs the water body.'" A
TMDL is the total maximum daily load of a pollutant that a water body can
support and still meet its water quality standards."
Although the federal government can compel states to create TMDLs, it
cannot dictate how a state actually enforces those limits."' Instead, the state is
free to determine how its TMDL limits are distributed among point source and
nonpoint source polluters.' 2 In Pjonsoh7o v Nastn, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that TMDLs do not create a federal mechanism to control nonpoint
-fumn-size/.
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source pollution." Rather, the federal government uses the "threat and promise of federal grants to the states to accomplish this task."" In City ofArcadha
v. US. En vironmentalProtectionAgency, the court similarly held that a TMDL
"does not, by itself, prohibit any conduct or require any actions," and "each
TMDL represents a goal that may be implemented by adjusting pollutant discharge requirements in individual NPDES permits or establishing nonpoint
source controls.""
E. STATE REGULATION OF NONPOINT SOURCE NUTRIENT POLLUTION IS
INCONSISTENT AND HAS NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM

Because the Clean Water Act largely leaves agricultural nutrient pollution
regulation to the states, and since not all states regulate agricultural nutrient pollution, this pollution source continues to contribute to the nation's growing algal
bloom problemi. Regulation of nonpoint source pollution remains the prerogative of the states."' Within the U.S., each state has developed its own nonpoint source regulatory scheme, resulting in fifty different nonpoint source management programs.
Indeed, states often elect not to regulate nonpoint
sources." Despite years of state regulation of nonpoint source pollution, agricultural nonpoint source pollution continues to be a major barrier to achieving
state and national water quality goals."
II. FINDING A SOLUTION TO ALGAL BLOOMS USING ECONOMIC
THEORIES

Framing some algal blooms and excessive agricultural nutrient pollution as
commons tragedies can provide insight into how to prevent future algal blooms.
This Part II frames some types of algal blooms as commons tragedies when the
actions of agricultural producers harm all water users within a given water basin,
including the agricultural producers themselves. Section D of this Part II then
draws an important distinction between algal blooms that fit nicely into a tragedy
of the commons framework and those that are more accurately framed as general interstate negative externality problems. This distinction between these two
classes of algal blooms, which is based primarily on the type of water basin in
which the bloom occurs, is crucial to tailoring effective policy strategies for each
class.
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THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

When there is open access to a scarce and rival resource, individual resource users are often incentivized to overuse the resource rather than protect
it for the benefit of all users."' This familiar set of incentives can ultimately lead
to the destruction or degradation of the shared resource, along with significant
associated social costs."' Garrett Hardin famously highlighted this phenomenon in his seminal 1968 article, The Tragedy ofthe Connons.'" In his article,
Hardin described an example of a commonly-held field used by several herdsmen for grazing."' The herdsmen individually internalized the benefits of letting
their animals graze on the field, while distributing the costs of overgrazing
among all members of the group. " Hardin observed that overgrazing would
ultimately lead to a ruined field that could not support any of the herdsmen's
cattle."' Hardin noted that the herdsmen, as rational actors, were nonetheless
"locked into a system" compelling them to add cattle to their herd until they
destroyed the resource."' Each rational, self-interested herdsman in this example did not factor in the costs of overgrazing on the field when choosing how
many animals to graze because this cost was borne collectively by the group."
In these situations, Hardin famously noted, "[fireedom in a commons brings
ruin to all."".
Hardin's metaphor is cited widely in efforts to justify environmental regulation." Hardin refers to his herdsman story as a tragedy because the consequence of rational, self-interested action in these scenarios is collective ruin.
Commonly shared resources are similarly said to present what are often referred to as collective action problems:"' individual parties generally do not engage in behavior aimed at preserving a common resource if they believe all other
parties will continue to destroy it.'
B. ALGAL BLOOMS AS A RESULT OF COMMONS TRAGEDIES

In watersheds confined within a single state, some algal blooms occur, in
part, from patterns of behavior among agricultural producers that mirror the
behavior of herdsmen from Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. Farmers who
141. Carol M. Rose, Rcthinking Enidoninentid Conols: Management Suatcgies for Conmon Resowrces, DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1991).
142. Id.
143. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedi ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id..
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Hardin, supia note 135, at 1244.
150. EiLINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITt'TIONS FOR
Coi.rcnvE AcTION 9 (1990) (Ostrom cites multiple authors including Heilbroner, Ehrenleld,
Carruthers, and Stoner who opined that some external control is necessary to avoid destruction
of natural resources).
151. Barton H. Thompson, 7)agicalkDiflicuht: The Obstaces to Goveming the Commons,
30 ENvTL. L. 241, 244 (2000).
152. Rose, supja note 141, at 3 (describing the conundrum Facing a fisherman who wants to
preserve a hatchery because the benefiLts of restocking the hatchery or abstaining from taking
more fish wvill mostly go to the other fishermen).
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over-fertilize and allow excess nutrients to flow into the watershed are acting in
their own best interest; they reap the benefits from adding more fertilizer to
their crops, but do not bear the whole cost of polluting the common resource,
the watershed.'
When an algal bloom occurs downstream from the farmers
overloading the watershed with nutrients, they assume the injury along with the
rest of the citizens of the state. These harms include the human health, environmental, and economic harms borne by the state. Such cases present ajustification for state regulation of the farmers because they should mutually agree
to the "mutual coercion" that protects their interests.' Because these algal
blooms in state contained watersheds fit within a tragedy of the commons framework, tried and tested solutions to similar commons problems could potentially
prevent future algal blooms.
C. OVERCOMING INTRASTATE COMMONS PROBLEMS INVOLVING
AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION
Established principles for responding to commons problems can be helpful
in evaluating potential means of reducing agricultural nutrient pollution and algal blooms within state-contained watersheds. Hardin suggested that it is generally possible to overcome the tragedy of the commons only through (1) privatization of the resource or (2) strong governmental regulation of the
resource. 5 Elinor Ostrom opined that the optimal policy approach often varies
depending on the situation, but sometimes local regulation by the resource users themselves is the best solution.'" These proposed solutions are analyzed
below in the context of nutrient pollution. It is worth noting that the solutions
considered in this section apply only to those algal blooms occurring fully within
intrastate watersheds and thus fit more squarely within the tragedy of the commons paradigm.
1. Hardin's Recommended Solutions
In cases of consumptive resource use, such as the field in Hardin's metaphor, privatization is often the best method to protect the resource.'" Privatization places the costs of overexploitation on the resource users, ideally causing
them to act to ensure the resource is not depleted.'" One often-overlooked
aspect of the privatization solution is the necessary administrative cost of dividing up a common resource."' Division of a natural resource inevitably leads to
inequitable wealth distributions and high decision-making and enforcement
costs." Moreover, privatization is not a practicable means of reducing nutrient
pollution because the waters receiving pollution in a watershed cannot be realistically privatized.
In the context of pollution, some scholars suggest that the only method of
153.
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overcoming the tragedy of the commons is through coercive laws or taxes."' For
example, Hardin suggested taxation can encourage resource users to stop destructive behavior.'" Due to the high complexity of measuring agricultural nonpoint source pollution and the unpredictable biology of algal blooms, such command and control regulations are costly. For example, the agency assigned to
set limits on nutrient pollution must determine the water body's assimilative
capacity, or the amount of pollution a water body can naturally assimilate without haring the water body.'" These determinations can be costly.'" Furthermore, agencies can only effectively regulate when they are sufficiently staffed
and have the ability to efficiently enforce agency rules.'
Of the two solutions suggested by Hardin, government regulation is more
likely to prevent algal blooms than privatization."' Regulation of nutrient pollution could happen in several ways, including taxes on nutrient inputs and requiring best management practices.
Hardin's work suggests that actors caught within the tragedy of the commons are locked within a vicious, inevitable cycle." Traditionally proposed
solutions suggest that strong centralized government or privatization of the resource are absolutely necessary to overcome the tragedy of the commons."
However, some scholars believe a third option exists."' Based on research of
small communities that have successfully managed common resources,' scholars, such as Elinor Ostrom, believe that some local resource users can overcome the tragedy of the commons through local, self-regulation."
2. Ostrom's Insights on Overcoming Commons Problems in Smaller,
Contained Systems
In some locations in which small communities share a scarce conunon resource, individual resource users have successfully overcome commons problems and preserved commonly-held resources."' In her book, Governingthe
Conmons, Elinor Ostrom recognized some of the important, common characteristics that these small communities share."' For a local community to efficiently govern its common resource, the community is generally small, stable,
161.
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has well-delineated resource boundaries, enjoys relatively small negative externalities, and the dynamics of the resource are well understood."'
Recent scholarship has expanded on this research, highlighting two essential elements."' First, successful group management requires a high perception
of risk associated with unified management of the resource."' For example,
when a group does not perceive that a lack of cooperation among group members will harm members of that group, even initial restraint by some group
members will ultimately fail to preserve the resource."'
Second, successful
group management is inhibited as group size increases."' Thus, a community
is most likely to successfully regulate the cormnonly-held resource when the
group size is small and the perception of risk is high.
Although self-regulation by resource users presents the most efficient
method to overcoming a tragedy of the commons, it is likely not feasible on the
scale of most algal blooms. This article has referenced algal blooms that occur
in watersheds contained within one state and blooms. that occur in interstate
watersheds.' The tragedy of the commons problem only exists for state-contained watersheds.' In most watersheds, there are too many resource users for
effective regulation of nutrient pollution by resource users without government
intervention. Additionally, the perception of risk is unlikely to be high enough
among agricultural nutrient polluters unless they are near the algal bloom.
3. Watersheds Contained within One State Fit a Tragedy of the Commons
Framework
Hardin's proposed regulatory approaches have the potential to effectively
reduce intrastate algal blooms because the scenarios under which the blooms
occur fit within a tragedy of the commons framework. The perverse incentives
of Hardin's tragedy exist within intrastate watersheds because the costs of pollution are internalized within the state.' Contrast this with an interstate watershed where an upstream state externalizes the costs of pollution to a downstream state and is ultimately unharmed by the downstream state's actions.'
175. NIVEs DoLsAK & EUNOR OSTROM, THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION 12-13 (2003).
176. Francisco C. Santos & Jorge M. Pacheco, Risk of Collective FailureProvides an Escape
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an interstate negative externality problem does not fit this paradigm. Say, for example, one herdsman in Hardin's example decided to give up animal husbandry and build a foundry on the commons. In time, the smelter's foundry emits fumes that kill all the grass in the field and his neighbor's animals starve. The neighbor bears all the costs of the smelter's actions, but the smelter is
free to continue polluting. Furthermore, even if the smelter's fumes do not kill his neighbor's
herds, his smelting operation is not hurt in the slightest by overgrazing. The relationship between
the smelter and the herdsmen is not a tragedy of the commons, but a negative externality problem,
as is pollution in an interstate watershed. But, in cases where a watershed is entirely contained
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States with water basins contained entirely within that state have more success
controlling algal blooms caused by nutrient pollution.' This is because a watershed contained within one state is under its singular sovereign authority. The
state is incentivized to regulate nutrient pollution because the costs of algal
blooms are borne within that state. Furthermore, the state has regulatory control over polluters within its borders, which provides for complete and comprehensive control of nutrient pollution within the state.
In summary, commons scholarship is a useful lens for viewing algal bloom
problems because it illuminates shortcomings in current nutrient pollution regulation and outlines the need for federal regulation in certain contexts. When
a conmmons problem is fully contained within one state, successful reduction of
algal blooms can occur through state regulation of nutrient pollution. However,
state regulation is less likely to successfully regulate nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds.
D. SOME ALGAL BLOOMS Do NOT FIT WITHIN THE TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS PARADIGM
In contrast, nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds does not present a
neatly-contained tragedy of the commons problem. Interstate nutrient pollution does not harm all resource users equally. A negative externality is created
when downstream water. users bear the cost of the upstream pollution while
upstream users remain unaffected." A market failure exists when society subsidizes a cost that is not borne by the upstream polluter.' For agricultural producers, the costs to one that over-fertilizes his field are low, but the costs to the
downstream user who must deal with the algal bloom are much higher."' In the
absence of some deterrent for the upstream agricultural producer, they will continue to pollute above the socially optimal level." Because interstate water basins extend beyond state borders, state regulators who declare waters within
their state impaired do not have the authority to reach some of the polluters,
making state regulation insufficient."' This negative externality problem requires federal intervention.

within one state, the costs and benefits of pollution are all brne by the same group - the state,
as is the case in a tragedy of the commons).
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35 E. EcoN.J., 14, 16 (2009) (discussing negative externalities in terms of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere).
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1. How Interstate Algal Blooms Present Negative Externality Problems
State regulation is unlikely to reduce algal blooms occurring from negative
externality problems in interstate watersheds because states lack the authority to
govern out-of-state polluters. Water bodies in the United States are considered
common resources because citizens have open access to their use.'" In a hypothetical stream within an interstate water basin, a person could pollute the
stream with algae causing nutrients, but be so far from the scene of an algal
bloom that she would never bear the cost of her actions. All the nonpoint
source polluters contribute to an impaired water, but the effects of the impaired
water are disproportionately felt by downstream states. Downstream states can
set TMDLs for impaired waters within their borders, but they lack authority to
enforce these limits against upstream polluters in other states.
Nonpoint source nutrient pollution shifts the cost of pollution to downstream water users in the form of a toxic algal bloom. The paradigm of a negative externality is a better framework for analyzing nutrient pollution in interstate
watersheds, because often the polluters in interstate watersheds do not bear the
cost of overloading the watershed with nutrients. Rational action does not lead
to common ruin;. instead, it contributes to ruin for downstream users. Because
not all polluters are located where an algal bloom occurs, federal regulators are
better situated than state regulators to reduce algal blooms in interstate watersheds.
2. General Strategies for Overcoming Negative Externality Problems
Regulators generally attempt to address negative externality problems either
by: (1) proscribing certain behaviors; or (2) using market forces to influence
behavior.9 The first method is commonly referred to as command and control
regulation. This form of regulation reacts to negative externalities by punishing
actions that create them.'" In the case of algal blooms, regulators could attempt
to stop the problem by prohibiting the discharge of nutrient pollution into waterbodies. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to completely prohibit all
pollution." Therefore, regulators can choose between limited proscription of
destructive behavior or market manipulation. For example, regulators can force
actors to internalize the cost of externalities by taxing activities that create negative externalities.
Regulation of negative externality-causing actions relies on the theory that
such regulation will correct a market failure and provide the best outcome for
society. " The optimal level of nutrient pollution will not lead to algal blooms,
because algal blooms impose a high cost on society.' In the context of the
2

190.

See generallyStephen D. Osborne et al., Laws GovemrngRecreationalAccessto Watcrs

ofthe Columbia Basin: A Survey and Analysis, 33 ENVTL. L. 399, 409-10 (2003).

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Contra Hardin, supra note 143, at 1244.
N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF EcoNoMics 202 (7th ed. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 202.
Houck, supra note 85, at 10430.
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tragedy of the commons, in theory the resource users should agree to be governed because their actions create algal blooms that harm the resource users."
In interstate water basins, the resource users would not similarly agree to such
governance, because others bear the costs of their pollution. The solutions to
negative externalities attempt to shift the cost of pollution back on to the polluters. In the context of interstate water basins, only the federal government has
the authority to regulate polluters in interstate water basins.

III. CRAFING FEDERAL REGULATION TO REDUCE INTERSTATE ALGAL
BLOOMS
In cases where watersheds are completely contained within a state, the cooperative federalism approach of the Clean Water Act may be sufficient to address the problem of algal blooms. In states where the costs that algal blooms
impose within a state are high, those costs are likely to lead the state to regulate
nutrient pollution within its borders. However, interstate watersheds require
more federal regulation than currently exists. Because the costs and benefits of
nutrient pollution within interstate watersheds are not borne equally among
states, polluting states that do not bear those costs are unlikely to regulate nutrient pollution. Until ellective federal regulations govern interstate watersheds,
the increased incidence of algal blooms is likely to continue.
A. THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM APPROACH OF THE CLEAN WATER

ACT CAN WORK IN STATE-CONTAINED WATERSHEDS
Some states have begun to combat the problem of algal blooms by regulating nonpoint source nutrient pollution.' Since 1972 when Congress made a
deliberate decision to leave regulation of nonpomit source nutrient pollution to
the states, the U.S. has seen decades of state-based attempts to solve this problem." Encouragingly, some states have taken significant steps to regulate nonpoint source nutrient pollution."' A survey conducted by the Environmental
Defense Fund found that nineteen states impose mandatory, enforceable requirements on agricultural nonpoint source pollution. 2 In these nineteen
states, the problem of agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution is being
solved through state regulation, albeit slowly. But why? And can this same
progress be expected in the remaining thirty-one states?
States that regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution do so because
algal blooms pose a risk to their individual state economies."' However, it is
unlikely that risk is felt universally among states. States that regulate nonpoint
source nutrient pollution have "significant and politically salient non-agricultural
interests in water quality."" These interests are particularly important because
198.
199.

Hardin, supm note 143, at 1247.
Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 2.

200. See id. at 2.
201. Id. at 2-3.
202. Id. at 12 (noting that even these mandatoir programs widely vary in the extent of their
regulation, with some programs imposing stricter regulations than others).
203. Id. at 13 (explaining, inter alia, that states that regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution have signifcant non-agricultural interests in water quality).
204. Craig & Roberts, supia note 33, at 13 (outlining six common factors among states that
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they allow the state to overcome opposition to agricultural nonpomit source regulation that comes from entrenched agricultural interests.2'
In cases where a watershed is entirely contained within a single state, the
costs of algal blooms are primarily felt within that state. As such, in-state disbursement of costs should sufficiently promote effective nutrient pollution regulation. For example, Florida is a major agricultural state, ranking seventh
among agricultural exporting states in 2011 .' In that year, agricultural exports
from Florida valued above $4 billion."' However, Florida's tourism industry is
valued at $76 billion dollars, a significant portion of which is tied to freshwater
recreation, such as sport-fishing and other tourism.a" The state government implemented significant regulation after determining that agricultural nonpoint
source pollution posed a threat to those interests." Factoring in the broader
impacts of the pollution borne within the state, regulators seemingly concluded
it worthwhile to regulate pollution sources rather than clean up watersheds after
the fact.2 Other states that regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution are
similarly situated; they bear most of the broader costs of nutrient pollution
within their own state boundaries."'
B. THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT HAS
FAILED INTERSTATE WATERSHEDS
In contrast, some polluting states may not have the incentives needed for
cooperative federalism to effectively reduce nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds if the costs of algal blooms are not borne by them. Interstate nutrient
pollution problems allow for actors in some states to shift the cost of their actions on to other states. Federal regulation is necessary to solve this negative
externality problem. Otherwise, algal blooms will continue to appear in interstate watersheds.
States that do not bear most of the costs of the algal blooms they cause lack
incentives to regulate nutrient pollution. Providing us with a salient example is
the Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic dead zone.' While dead-zone border states like
Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi could strengthen nutrient pollution regulations as the problem worsens, other upriver, agricultural states like Iowa will not
perceive the risks from algal blooms and hypoxia in the same way. Such is the

actively regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution: (1) each state regulates nutrient pollution
that is exempt from the national NPDES system; (2) agriculture is a significant element of the
state economy; (3) each program seeks to solve problems outlined in the CWA; (4) each state
has significant non-agricultural interests in water quality; (5) each program has been identified as
at least partially effective; and (6) each state approaches regulation in its own unique way).
205. See id. at 1, 13.

206.
207.
208.

Id. at 13.

Id
Id.

209. Id. at 14.
210. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 14.
211. See id. at 16-24 (outlining the specific situations of Oregon and Wisconsin agricultural
and water quality interests).

212. See Sarah White, Gulf Hypoxia: Can a Legal Remedy Breathe LIfe Into the Oxygen
Depleted Watcrs?, 5 DRAKE.J. AGRIc. L. 519, 519-24 (2000) (providing, inter alia, an overview
of the conflict that nutrient pollution in the Mississippi River creates between upriver agriculture
and downriver fishing and coastal interests).
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weakness of the Clean Water Act's cooperative federalism approach. By leaving regulation of nonpoint source nutrient pollution to the states, the Clean Water Act sets interstate watersheds up to fail.
To solve the problem of algal blooms in interstate watersheds, the federal
government must either regulate nutrient pollution directly or somehow shift
the costs of pollution back onto the agricultural nonpoint sources in polluting
states. Only through that approach can nutrient pollution be curtailed at the
source. Agricultural nonpoint sources that pollute interstate watersheds will
bear the cost of pollution, regardless of their proximity to the resulting algal
bloom.
IV. SPECIFIC POLICY STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES IN INTERSTATE NUTRIENT POLLUTION

Although the peculiarities of waterbodies would tend to favor local and state
control of watershed management over federal control, state regulation does
not adequately address the interstate externality problems associated with agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution. The lack of federal nonpoint
source regulation allows actors in some states to shift the costs of their actions
onto actors in other states, creating negative externalities that are difricult for
states to address. However, creating a workable federal-level response to this
problem is deceptively difficult. Merely expanding the reach of the Clean Water Act's NPDES program is unlikely to be successful, and enacting national
programs that mirror successful state programs ignores the unique nature of
individual watersheds. States can effectively regulate intrastate water basins. An
ideal approach to interstate water basins will allow for state control as much as
possible, yet allow for federal intervention when more localized governance
fails."'
A. CHIPPING AWAY AT THE AGRICiLTURAL LOOPHOLE IN THE CLEAN
WATER ACT's NPDES PROGRAM

One of the most initially attractive solutions to the problem of interstate
agricultural nutrient pollution and algal blooms is to remove the exemption of
agricultural discharges from the Clean Water Act. Increased federal control of
point source pollution through NPDES regulation has produced results."
However, bringing nonpoint source pollution within regulation of the NPDES
program could be problematic. Agricultural nonpoint source pollution is difficult to measure." The amount of nutrient pollution that leaves a field varies
with the weather, soil conditions, geology, etc.' This is fundamentally different
from the measurement of point source pollution, where measurement occurs

213. Sc Rose, supla note 141, at 12-14.
214. Angelo & Monis, supna note 32, at 1004.
215. See MARC. 0. RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. )EP'r OF AGRIc., ERS No. 782, EcoNOMICs oF
WATER QUALITY PROTEcTION FROM NONPOINT SOURCES 21 (1999) (explaining that nonpoint
source pollution is prohibitively expensive to measure because the "amount and quality of runo T
leaving a field depend not only on factors that can be measured, such as the technology used and
the use of variable inputs, but also on factors such as rainfall that vary daily and are dilicult to
predict").
216. Id.
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at the point of discharge."' In addition to nonpomit source pollution, agricultural operations produce point source nutrient pollution that is exempt from
regulation under the Clean Water Act."' These include agricultural return
flows,m agricultural stormwater discharges," and polentially drainage tiles,
ditches, and pipes." These sources of nutrient pollution do not share the same
measurement difficulties as nonpoint sources, and thus, could fit under NPDES
program regulation as point sources. 222
The definition of a point source has been extended in thd past to cover
previously unregulated sources of pollution.2 22 The most significant of which
was the reclassification of municipal or industrial stormwater discharges as point
sources."' This brought municipal and industrial stormwater discharges under
the regulation of the NPDES program.' In theory, current unregulated point
sources like agricultural return flows, agricultural stormwater drainage, and
other drainage could fit under the NPDES program in the same way. However,
an examination of each should occur to protect against an unintentional increase of nutrient pollution.
1. Regulating Agricultural Stormwater Discharges under the NPDES Program
Previous expansions of the NPDES program took care to avoid creating
perverse incentives for those operating under them." In 1987, Congress's
Stonrwater Amendments to the program recognized that channeled, piped, or
captured stormwater should be regulated as a point source under the Clean
Water Act.2 7 These amendments contained a few important exceptions. For
example, under the Stormwater Amendments, NPDES permits are not required for stormwater that is diverted around mines or oil and gas operations
that does not contact wastes from those operations." This keeps these mining
and fossil fuel operations from becoming regulated as point sources of pollution." If stormwater diversions were regulated as point sources while runoff
was not, a mining operation would be incentivized to avoid any regulatory burden by allowing undiverted runoff to carry pollutants from the operation into a

217. Id.
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (excepting agricultural return flows and stormwater drainage from
the definition of regulated point sources under the Clean Water Act).

219. Id.
220. Id
221. See Complaint at ff 1, 10, Bd. of Water Works Tr. v. Sacramento City Bd. of Supervisors, No. 5:15-cv-04020 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 16, 2015) (pending litigation alleging that drainage systems that remove nitrogen from soil and introduce it into a river are required, inter alia, to obtain
an NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act).
222. See RIBAUDO, supra note 215, at 21 (similar to traditional point source discharge, the
nutrients from these sources can be measured at the point of discharge).
223. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 10.
224. Id. at 10-11 (explaining how piped, channeled, or captured stormwater, when discharged,
is now classified as a point source falling under regulation under the NPDES program).
225. Id.
226. Craig, supra note 137, at 191-92.
227. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 10.
228. Craig, supra note 137, at 191-92.
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water body.' The pollution in this situation would be worse than any incidental
nutrients picked up through a diversion. This same rationale applies to agricultural stormwater discharges.
Regulating agricultural stormwater discharges under the NPDES program
would unfortunately be likely to create perverse incentives. Under the Stormwater Amendments, agricultural stormwater discharges are also exempt from
NPDES regulation." Removing this exemption could create the same problems that would come from stormwater regulation of a mine. Instead of diverting stormwater away from farm fields, farmers would be incentivized to allow
runoff to flow through fields. Undiverted stormwater would then pick up fertilizers and nutrients along the way. Thus, even though NPDES regulation of
agricultural stormwater discharges would seem to make sense, it ultimately
could make the problem of agricultural nutrient pollution worse.
2. Regulating Agricultural Return Flows under the NPDES Program
As stated above, regulating agricultural return flows under the NPDES system could reduce agricultural nutrient pollution, but it is undesirable because it
could create incentives for inefficient water use. The return flow exemption
was created primarily to protect farmers in western states who rely on irrigation
for their water needs." Farmers claimed that NPDES penmits for return flows
discriminated against farmers in arid western states where water scarcity made
ditches and drains vital.' Indeed, requiring NPI)ES permits for return flows
could create perverse incentives for farmers in a similar way to agricultural
stormwater regulation. In western states, water shortages are a real danger."'
However, requiring NPDES permits for return flows could create disincentives
for farmers to return unused and sorely needed water back to the system.' Unless the federal government were to regulate both agricultural point sources and
agricultural nonpoint sources, it would be almost impossible to craft regulation
to avoid this problem. Thus, regulation of agricultural return flows is better left
to the states to ensure that a comprehensive approach is taken.
B. MANDATORY BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Mandating best management practices ("BMPs") to reduce agricultural runoff nutrient pollution is unlikely to reduce nutrient levels enough to stop algal
blooms. BMPs can have a surprisingly large influence on common behavior.'

230.

Id.

231.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(I)(1).

232. Andrew C. Hanson & David C. Bcnder, IrragationReturn Flow or Disci -etcDischaige?
Wf' Water Pollution fron (rnibern Bogs Shoudd Eill Withi the Clean Water Act's NPDES
ProgaI, 37 ENvt. L. 339, 352 (2007).

233.
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234. Brian C. Howard, Worst Droughtin 1,000 Yars PreclietcdlbrAincican West, NA-r'L
GEioGRAPHIC (Feb. 12, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/02/150212-mcgadrought-southwest-water-climatc-environiment/ (citing studies that predict an over 80% chance of
a "mcgadrought" in the American West by 2100. This drought would be expected to last 35
years or longer).
235. Hanson & Bender, supra note 232, at 352.
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The major drawback to BMPs, however, is that they encourage common practices instead of the most effective practice." Federal statutes direct agencies to
consider best practices in many different areas of regulation.' Despite this
drawback to BMPs, they are still used by many agencies because they have relatively low administrative costs and they successfully influence behavior. The
EPA currently seeks to incentivize the use of best management practices to limit
nonpoint source pollution."'
1. Success of BMPs for State-Contained Water Basins
BMPs have been successful at reducing nutrient pollution at the state level
when the target water body is contained entirely within a state. Success can be
attributed to the small number of users who can recognize the importance of
protecting the resource."' The most common BMPs for reducing phosphorous
from agricultural runoff are buffer zones, which involves the application of fertilizer below the soil and utilization of cover crops."' Although best management practices can be useful for reducing nitrogen pollution from agricultural
runoff for waterbodies contained within a single state, the program is less effective at the federal level.
2. Failure of BMPs in Interstate Water Basins
Although BMPs have changed the behavior of farmers at the state level,
they are unlikely to have a similar impact at the federal level. Under section
1329 of the Clean Water Act, states are required to create an assessment report
for navigable waters within their jurisdiction that will not meet water quality
standards due to nonpoint source pollution."' States must also create management programs that must identify the BMP the nonpoint sources will employ
and the method the state will use to ensure nonpoint sources adopt these
BMPs." This is the current strategy that the Clean Water Act uses to reduce
nonpoint source pollution before the state declares a water to be impaired. The
advantages to BMPs are flexibility and lower administrative costs for the government and agencies.2" Despite the perceived advantages of BMPs for reducIng nonpoint source nutrient pollution, algal blooms cortinue to appear with
237.

Id. at 298.

238. See id. at 296 (citing multiple statutes that direct agencies to consider best practices, including 7 U.S.C. § 6711(c) (2012) for agricultural programs); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A
Century ofAir Pollution ControlLaw: What's Worked; Whats Failed; What Might Work, 21
ENvTL. L. 1549, 1597-98 (1999) (describing how the EPA created guidelines in 1976 to lower
greenhouse gas emissions that allowed factories to build tall smokestacks to meet emissions requirements in lieu of emission limitations. Ultimately, the guidelines led to a massive increase in
the number of tall smokestacks but no reduction in greenhouse gas emissions because factories
chose to build taller smokestacks, rather than pay for more expensive, but also more effective
pollution controls).
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growing frequency, an indication that nutrient pollution remains a problem for
navigable waters that are required to implement BMPs.
Because the adoption of BMPs is voluntary in most states, BMPs do not
present a realistic solution to curbing the proliferation of algal blooms. Under
the CWA, the adoption of BMPs is voluntary, which leads to inconsistent results." Recognizing that there might be little incentive for some states to require
BMPs from non-point sources, the EPA currently offers funds for the continuation of best management programs when states can show that the BMPs used
are effective at meeting the state's water quality goals." Although the BMPs that
have been adopted appear to be effective at reducing nutrient pollution," they
are generally too expensive for most farmers and not enough farmers utilize the
practices." Farmers are reluctant to adopt expensive practices, especially when
there is often no guarantee that the BMPs will lead to a reduced risk of algal
blooms."'
Ultimately, BMPs are not the best solution for reducing nutrient pollution
in interstate water basins. Although some of these solutions have been effective
at reducing nutrient levels in agricultural runoff, BMPs alone do not address the
issue of the assimilative capacity of the water body. If nutrient pollution reductions are not targeted at meeting the assimilative capacity of the water body, then
algal blooms could continue to proliferate despite reductions of nutrient polluLion. The practices are meant to reduce nutrient pollution, but even if all farmers adopt the best common practices for reducing nutrient pollution, that might
not be enough to reduce nutrient loads enough to stop algal blooms.
C. TAxEs AND INCENTIVES
Taxes could influence farmers to reduce nutrient application to their fields,
leading to less nutrient pollution and fewer algal blooms. If the cost of fertilizers
containing nitrogen and phosphorous were raised by a tax, farmers would be
induced to purchase and use less fertilizer. This form of market correcting tax
is commonly known as a Pigouvian tax, drawing its name from Arthur Pigou.2
An input Pigouvian tax artificially raises the cost of the nutrients, forcing the
producer to internalize the cost."' Input Pigouvian taxes present the only feasi-
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ble method of shifting the cost of nutrient pollution back onto the polluter, because pollution from nonpoint sources is difficult to measure and track." Because the cost shifting for nutrient pollution is difficult to track in agricultural
runoff, the only way to raise the cost of pollution for the agricultural producer
is by increasing the cost of the nutrient inputs.
1. Potential for Pigouvian Success
Pigouvian taxes can incentivize famers to fertilize at the optimal level for
society." One of the benefits of a nutrient input tax over command and control
regulation is the ability to shift the cost of pollution back on to the polluter at a
relatively low cost to the government while avoiding the difficult issue of identifying and quantifying pollution from nonpoint sources." If the regulator could
set the cost of the tax at the level of the external cost of the pollution, then the
farmers would pollute at the socially optimal level.' In addition, a Pigouvian
tax would have the added benefit of raising revenue that either could be used
to lower other taxes or to clean up existing algal blooms.
A tax on nutrient inputs can be compared to the carbon tax, which is one
of the most popular solutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions among
economists." In the absence of a deterrent tax, people have no incentive to
reduce carbon emissions because the cost of carbon emissions are borne by
society, creating a negative externality problem." Increasing a tax on carbon
emissions would encourage the development of cleaner energy and less consumption of fossil fuels. Similarly, a tax on nutrients should encourage fanrers
to develop alternative methods of fertilizing crops because the cost of fertilizing
at the same level will be too expensive.
2. Inevitable Failure of Pigouvian Taxes in Reducing Algal Blooms
However, farming operations are so diverse and complex that a universal
Pigouvian tax on nutrient inputs is unlikely to effectively reduce algal blooms
without causing unintended consequences. One of the major deficiencies of a
nutrient input tax is that it universally raises the cost of nutrient fertilizer on all
farmers. Therefore, all farmers must spend more to fertilize their crops, regardless of how much algae-causing nutrient pollution they discharge. Some
crops will require far less nitrogen and phosphorous than other crops. Additionally, some farms are in locations where natural buffer zones or low water
tables lead to less nutrients in agricultural runoff. Targeting a tax so that it only
applies to polluting actors, would significantly raise the administrative cost of

ENVTL. ScL. & POL'Y 133,138 (2005) (explaining how behavior can be influenced in a cost-effective manner by setting the storrnwater charge at the marginal aggregate cost to the watershed).
252. Sheriff, supra note 249, at 547-48.
253. MANKiw, supra note 183, at 203.
254. See Mankiw, supranote 188, at 16-17; see also Sheriff, supra note 249, at 550.
255. MANKIw, supra note 183, at 203-04.
256. See Brian Andrew, Market Failure, Government Failure and Externaibies i Chimate
Change Migation: The Case for a Carbon Tax, 28 PUB. ADMIN. & DEv. 393, 393-94 (2008).
257. Mankiw, supra note 188, at 16.
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the tax.' Allowing the tax to apply universally would be unfair and could encourage less than optimal fertilization by farmers.
Additionally, determining the appropriate price of a Pigouvian tax is difficult. Ideally, the cost of the increase in nutrient inputs should equal the cost
borne by society." This is difficult to measure. Finally, many fanners operating
under tight margins would be unable to afford the higher cost of fertilizers. Due
to this increased cost of setting the appropriate price for the tax and the inability
of the tax to target polluting nonpoint sources, the Pigouvian tax is not the best
solution for reducing nutrient pollution from agricultural producers.
D. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
Because it is possible that some farmers simply do not know that overloading of nutrients in waterbodies can lead to algal blooms, another potential means
of combating the growing incidence of algal blooms is to implement more educational programs concerning nutrient pollution for farmers. Educational prograns can inform farmers about a potentially unknown externality, which could
cause farmers to factor the cost of pollution into their decision-making.' Educating farmers about the negative effects of their actions will also have the elfect
of increasing their perception of risk to the common resource. An increased
perception of risk could encourage more responsible behavior to protect the
common resource. When the perception of risk is high and there is a small
number of resource users, it is possible for the common resource to be preserved by local self-regulation.
Educational programs can be an attractive method to encourage better nutrient management because the administrative costs are low and no action is
compelled from farmers 2 Although there are theories that suggest that educational programs can be an effective method for overcoming negative externalities, these programs by themselves will not be enough to stop nutrient pollution
and the resulting algal blooms.
1. Existing Theory Supporting the Use of Educational Programs
Under the theory regarding self-regulation of common resources, a common resource can be protected by the resource users if there are a small number of resource users and the perception of risk to the resource is high among
resource users.' An educational program describing the dangers of nutrient
pollution raises the perception of risk for farmers because it explains how nutrient pollution causes algal blooms. Despite the raised perception of risk, it is
unlikely that polluters will perceive the risk to them as high enough for them to
stop polluting. There is also empirical evidence that suggests that educational

258. Id. at 20 (describing how a gasoline tax is not a perfect Pigouvian response for driving
congestion because somc roads are more congested than others, but the tax increases the cost of
gasoline for all drivers).
259. MANKw, supna note 183, at 203.
260. Marc A. Ribaudo & Richard D. Horan, The Role of Educatio in Nonpoint Source Pollution ControlPobicj;21 Rrv. AGRIC. ECON. 331, 335 (1999).
261. Santos & Pacheco, supla note 176, at 10421-23.
262. Ribaudo, supra note 260, at 332, 340.
263. Santos & Pacheco, supm note 176, at 10421-23.
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programs, coupled with other management strategies, can effectively encourage
the adoption of environmentally friendly practices.' However, these educational programs are generally only effective when the reduction in nutrient loading also leads to increased profitability for the farmers.'
2. Why Educational Programs for Nutrient Management Fail at Correcting
Negative Externalities in Nutrient Pollution
Unfortunately, educational programs alone are not likely to sufficiently alter
farmrers' nutrient loading practices to prevent major algal blooms. Particularly
for interstate waterways that span many states, it is possible for nonpoint source
polluters to be so far removed from resulting algal blooms that it is unlikely that
farmers will change polluting behavior even if they know that it could be causing
problems downstream. Due to the complexity of nutrient pollution and the
number of potential nonpoint source polluters, it is difficult to prove which
farmers contribute to nutrient pollution and algal blooms.' For similar reasons,
an educational program in California aimed at influencing farmers to adopt
more efficient nitrate management practices has not been effective despite four
years of efforts."' In general, educational programs only have the desired effect
of influencing behavior to adopt better management practices if the new practice
will also be more profitable for the farmer or if the information indicates to the
farmer that water quality is impaired on his property." Because the success of
educational programs is dependent on how farmers will react to them, educational programs are not a good solution to slow the growing incidence of algal
blooms.
E. FORCING POLLUTING STATES TO BEAR THE COST OF NUTRIENT
POLLUTION

Even interstate, basin-wide TMDLs will not stop algal blooms in interstate
waters until affected states or the EPA are empowered to compel polluting states
to curb nutrient pollution. State-led, nonpoint source regulation is not stopping
algal blooms in interstate watersheds." Many water basins cover multiple states,
which means that pollution in one state obviously has adverse impacts on downstream states. Consequently, many state-based programs for the regulation of
nutrient pollution have failed. Basin-wide TMDLs could internalize the externalities created by this market failure. However, TMDLs need a mechanism
to allow the federal government to force polluting states to comply with the
TMDL requirements." Until states or the EPA have enforcement power over

264. Ribaudo, supra note 260, at 332 (citing to Darrell J. Bosch et al., Vohumtay Vcrsus MandatoryAgiculturalPociesto Protect Water Qualy Adoption ofNirogen Testmingin Nebraska,
17 REv. AGRIc. EcoN. 13, 15 (1995)).
265. RIBAUDO, supranote 120, at25-26; see also Ribaudo, supra note 260, at 336.
266. Ribaudo, supra notc 260, at 338.

267. Id. at 337-38.
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269. See, e.g., STEINZOR & ISAACSON, supra note 112, at 4 (where the Chesapeake Bay's interstate TMDL has still not ended nutrient pollution because of a lack of enforcement).
270. Id. at 2.
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TMDLs, even interstate TMDLs cannot stop algal bloom-causing nutrient pollution.
1. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL and the Weaknesses of Interstate TMDLs
under Current Law

"

As the interstate TMDL for the East Coast's Chesapeake Bay shows, such
interstate TMDL policies are only effective if sufficient enforcement mechanisms and powers are in place. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is an ambitious
attempt at basin-wide pollution control, but thus far it has not been as effective
as hoped. The creation of an interstate TMDL in the Chesapeake Bay watershed and certain other watersheds is an important step in combating nutrient
pollution and algal blooms. However, unenforced interstate TMDLs are still
lacking necessary enforcement power and are thus limited in their effectiveness. 271
The Chesapeake Bay watershed is so massive that effective regulation of
nutrient pollution necessitates an interstate approach."' The bay spans over
64,000 miles and is one of the most productive water bodies in the world.
Five major rivers and over 100,000 streams drain into the bay from a watershed
that spans six states.' The Chesapeake Bay is both gigantic and shallow, which
allows for the incredible diversity of life that exists in the bay.7 But shallow
water also keeps nutrients, pollution, and heat from flushing out to sea.2 "' Not
surprisingly, the Chesapeake Bay is vulnerable to algal blooms and hypoxia.
The health of the Bay became such a dire problem that in 2010, the EPA
worked with states within the watershed to create an interstate TMDL."
The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is the largest water restoration project in the
world2 and was created to regulate pollution levels for the District of Colombia
and the six states found within its water basin."o This TMDL was created
through the joint efforts of the EPA and the states within the water basin."'
Spanning seven major jurisdictions, it is the most complex TMDL in the country."' The TMDL sets nitrogen and phosphorous pollution allocations for the
1

271. Id. at 2-3 (asserting that the Chesapeake Bay TMDL is destined to fail without EPA
enforcement).
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water basin states and requires the EPA to work with the states to develop watershed implementation plans." These plans were originally developed by the
states and approved or modified by the EPA." The watershed implementation
plans describe which technologies the states have committed to implement to
meet the pollution allocations for the watershed."
The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is an example of how interstate cooperation
is needed to set realistic pollution reduction goals. The interstate TMDL in the
Chesapeake Bay sets an impressive standard for interstate TMDLs because it
engaged individual actors, such as nonpoint source polluters, and states in the
effort to create a basin-wide TMDL.` The Chesapeake Bay TMDL can serve
as a model of federal and state collaboration for other interstate water basins.
It is only through this goal setting and planning process that interstate water
bodies will set meaningful goals for reducing nutrient pollution and preventing
future algal blooms. The more difficult aspect of using interstate TMDLs to
reduce nutrient pollution will be the issue of enforcing state compliance with
these goals.
Despite the creation of an ambitious interstate TMDL for the Chesapeake
Bay, states within the watershed will probably not meet their 2017 interim goals
without enforcement of the standards set by the TMDL.m1 7 Some states within
the watershed have made progress by further reducing nutrient pollution from
already regulated sources."" However, increased reductions of point sources
will ultimately be insufficient to meet the goals of the TMDL, and unregulated
nonpoint source pollution will still need to be curtailed to meet them."' For
example, Virginia and the District of Columbia relied heavily on state-of-the-art
wastewater treatment plant pollution control but have not regulated any other
sources of nutrient pollution.' Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, the agricultural
sector alone contributes over twenty-five percent of the nitrogen pollution in the
watershed, which is more than all other pollution sectors in the state of Virginia."' Without an enforcement mechanism to compel states like Pennsylvania
to act, the Chesapeake Bay TMDL will be unable prevent future algal blooms
in the once pristine Chesapeake Bay.'
2. Empowering Affected States to Compel Polluting States' TMDL
Compliance
Strengthening the TMDL program to allow the EPA or affected states to
compel action by polluting states could be one means of providing the additional power needed to reduce future algal blooms in interstate water basins.
283. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supranote 281, at ES-1.
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Because TMDLs are watershed-based, they are better tailored to address the
negative externality problems that contribute to algal blooms in these settings by
holding all actors within a watershed accountable. TMDLs are created in collaboration with states, which gives voice to state interests and concerns. However, a state's failure to meet its target goals should result in federal enforcement
of those goals. Alternatively, states could be empowered to compel action by
bringing claims against polluting states that have agreed to TMDL levels set
through an agreement between the states. This would provide a means for affected states to shift the externalities created by upstream, pollution states back
onto those actors.
Creating an interstate TMDL enforcement mechanism would reduce algal
bloom-causing nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds to more cost-justifiable levels. For the same reasons that states attempt to balance their own costs
and benefits when regulating nutrient pollution within their borders, strengthening interstate TMDL enforcement could promote more cost-effective and
optimal regulation when interstate watersheds are involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nutrient pollution from agricultural nonpoint sources is contributing to a
growing algal bloom problem in the United States. In recent years, inadequate
regulation of nonpoint sources has been a major factor that has led to an increased quantity and severity of algal blooms. This growing nutrient pollution
problem is largely attributable to conditions creating what legal scholars often
refer to as commons tragedies, general externality, and collective action problems. Because agricultural nonpoint sources lack sufficient incentives to curb
algae-causing pollution, stronger government intervention is necessary to address this issue and reduce future algal blooms.
The distinction between algal blooms that occur in interstate watersheds
and those that occur within state-contained watersheds is important in addressing these challenges. Among other things this distinction helps to explain why
some states have been successful at regulating nutrient pollution whereas others
have not. Algal blooms in state-contained watersheds can often be framed as
connons tragedies, where all those who contribute to the problem also directly
suffer its consequences. In these settings, it should generally be possible for
state level pollution regulation to emerge that is capable of addressing the issue
because the harms of the pollution are contained within the state. In contrast,
algal blooms that occur in interstate watersheds represent a broader negative
externality problem. State governments are often not as motivated to effectively
regulate in these instances because many of the harms resulting from the pollution are suffered outside the state where the pollution occurs. Accordingly, federal government regulation is necessary to regulate nutrient pollution in these
watersheds.
One potential means for more effective regulation of nutrient pollution in
interstate watersheds would be to increase the federal government's authority to
enforce interstate TMDLs. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL illustrates why such
an approach is necessary in these circumstances. Other interstate watersheds
could benefit from utilizing a similar cooperative approach for setting interstate
TMDLs that also empowered individual states to bring actions against out-of-
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state actors when interstate pollution is a material contributor to algal blooms.
Through thoughtfully-designed policies tailored to algal blooms' unique characteristics, policymakers can hopefully curb the growth of these blooms and
protect our precious waterways and water bodies for many generations to come.

